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Brain Responses to the Acquired
Moral Status of Faces
cially relevant stimuli provide evidence for the impor-
tance of the above proposed neural circuitry for social
cognition. For example, activation in posterior STS is
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seen during perception of biological motion as well asInstitute of Neurology
during more abstract tasks involving inferences aboutUniversity College of London
intentions, beliefs, and feelings of other persons (forLondon WC1N 3BG
reviews, see Allison et al., 2000; Frith and Frith, 2003;United Kingdom
Puce and Perrett, 2003). Further evidence for this cir-
cuitry derives from imaging studies focusing on the pro-
cessing of socially salient features in the human faceSummary
such as emotional expressions (Morris et al., 1996; Phil-
lips et al., 1997; Winston et al., 2003), facial attractivenessWe examined whether neural responses associated
(Aharon et al., 2001; O’Doherty et al., 2003), trustworthi-with judgments of socially relevant aspects of the hu-
ness (Winston et al., 2002), or racial identity (Hart et al.,man face extend to stimuli that acquire their signifi-
2000; Phelps et al., 2000; Phelps, 2001). These studiescance through learning in a meaningful interactive con-
highlight engagement of the amygdala, dorsal and ventraltext, specifically reciprocal cooperation. During fMRI,
striatum, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), insula, and higher-subjects made gender judgments on faces of people
order visual areas such as fusiform face areas and supe-who had been introduced as fair (cooperators) or un-
rior temporal sulcus (STS) in deliberative and implicitfair (defector) players through repeated play of a se-
social judgments.quential Prisoner’s Dilemma game. To manipulate moral
In everyday situations, individuals base their socialresponsibility, players were introduced as either inten-
judgment not only on features inherent in the humantional or nonintentional agents. Our behavioral (like-
face, but also on inferences about the other peoplebility ratings and memory performance) as well as our
arising from socially meaningful contexts. One salientimaging data confirm the saliency of social fairness
example is the degree of perceived cooperativenessfor human interactions. Relative to neutral faces, faces
of another person. Reciprocal exchange or cooperationof intentional cooperators engendered increased ac-
is ubiquitous in behavior among primates. In conse-tivity in left amygdala, bilateral insula, fusiform gyrus,
quence, the ability to recognize and discriminate againstSTS, and reward-related areas. Our data indicate that
those who do not reciprocate cooperation is crucial forrapid learning regarding the moral status of others is
effective social interactions, allowing us to know who toexpressed in altered neural activity within a system
approach or avoid (see also Cosmides and Tooby, 2000).associated with social cognition.
Analytical models and computer simulations devel-
oped in the fields of theoretical biology and economicsIntroduction
provide evidence of evolutionary advantage in the emer-
gence of mutual cooperation or “direct reciprocity” (Ax-Human evolution can be viewed in terms of the species’
elrod, 1984; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; or “reciprocalincreasing ability to function effectively within a social
altruism,” e.g., Trivers, 1971) as well as “indirect reci-context. By consequence, our brain has evolved a spe-
procity” (e.g., Alexander, 1987; Nowak and Sigmund,cialized ability for social cognition (“the processing of
1998a). The possibility of reputation formation or “imageinformation which culminates in the accurate perception
scoring” in individuals has also been suggested to con-
of the dispositions and intentions of other individuals”
tribute to the emergence of indirect reciprocity in human
[Brothers, 1990; page 28]). Brothers proposed that the
societies (Milinski et al., 2002; Nowak and Sigmund,
amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), inferotemporal 1998b; Nowak et al., 2000; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000).
face-responsive regions, and superior temporal sulcus Empirical data from social dilemma experiments sug-
(STS) represent areas primarily involved in the pro- gest that people have strong aversions against being
cessing of socially relevant information. Adolphs (2003) deceived when playing with others for monetary payoffs.
extended this proposal differentiating higher-order sen- For example, individuals involved in Public Good Games
sory cortices such as fusiform gyrus and superior tem- are willing to punish noncooperators or “free-riders”
poral sulcus involved in detailed perceptual processing even if punishment is costly and does not provide any
with the amygdala, ventral striatum, and orbitofrontal benefits for the punisher (e.g., Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000,
cortex linking sensory representations of stimuli to their 2002). In accordance with theories of inequity aversion
motivational value. Anterior cingulate cortex as well as (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), there is even evidence that
insular-somatosensory cortices have also been associ- monkeys also reject unfair offers and react negatively
ated with feeling states that reflect representation of when observing a conspecific obtaining a more attrac-
changes in bodily states arising from processing emo- tive reward for equal effort (Brosnan and De Waal, 2003).
tion-eliciting stimuli (e.g., Adolphs, 1999; Critchley et al., Neural evidence for inequity aversion in humans has
2000, 2001; Damasio, 1994; Dolan, 2002). been provided in a fMRI study showing enhanced activ-
Functional imaging studies using emotional and so- ity in brain areas related to emotions (bilateral anterior
insula and ACC) in response to unfair offers of human
partners in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al., 2003). In*Correspondence: t.singer@fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk
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contrast, a study by Rilling et al. (2002), in which people Results
played a version of a simultaneous Prisoner’s Dilemma
Behavioral DataGame, showed enhanced activity in reward-related ar-
Following the scanning session, we assessed severaleas such as striatum, rostral ACC, and OFC during mu-
behavioral measures. We report behavioral analysestual cooperation. Striatum and rostral ACC were acti-
based on the pooled sample of the behavioral pilot andvated solely when playing with human but not computer
the scanned sample (n  21). Statistical tests revealedpartners (though the interaction was not explicitly tested).
no significant differences between the behavioral pat-Reward-related areas such as ventral striatum and OFC
terns observed in these two samples. Results of a mem-as well as amygdala were identified in other fMRI studies
ory task are reported for the scanned sample as theusing financial rewards (Breiter et al., 2001; Delgado et
format of the task was changed after the pilot by addingal., 2000; Elliott et al., 2000, 2003; Knutson et al., 2000;
a “don’t know” option (see Experimental Procedures).O’Doherty et al., 2001), in line with animal literature on
Involvement in Intentional versus Nonintentionalreward processing (e.g., Schultz, 2000).
Task ConditionIn the present study, we used event-related functional
Analyses of the debriefing questionnaire (Table 1) re-magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate im-
vealed that subjects (n  21) rated themselves as beingplicit social judgments of people who differ in their ac-
more emotionally involved with [mean ratings  1.5quired moral status. Moral status was here defined by
versus .23; paired t test, t(20)  8.21, p  0.001] and
differential histories of fair or unfair behavior during
more angry about [mean ratings  1.3 versus 1.0;
social interactions. Thus, and in contrast to previous
paired t test, t(20)  8.63, p  0.001] defectors in the
imaging studies that have mainly focused on social intentional compared to the nonintentional task condi-
judgments of unfamiliar faces with regard to emotional tion. In addition, subjects rated the playing partners to
expression, attractiveness, race, or trustworthiness (e.g., be more real in the intentional compared to the noninten-
Hart et al., 2000; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Morris et al., 1996; tional task condition [mean ratings  1.33 versus .04;
Winston et al., 2002), we aimed to investigate processing paired t test, t(20)  4.37, p  0.001]. These differences
of socially relevant cues that acquired their significance are summarized in a composite measure (mean over the
through learning in an interactive context. To achieve three questions) reflecting overall involvement in both
this goal, subjects were scanned while they made gen- task conditions [mean ratings1.38 versus.39; paired
der judgments of faces of people previously familiarized t test, t(20)  9.02, p  0.001] and displayed for each
through repeated playing of a version of a sequential of the three questions in Figure 1A.
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In this game, one person Likeability Ratings
(“first mover,” who was always the scanned participant) A repeated measures analysis of variance with the two
has to decide whether to cooperate or to defect, and in within subject factors “social behavioral status” (coop-
a second step the other person (the “second mover” erators, neutral, defectors) and “task condition” (inten-
identified by a facial photograph) decides whether to tional, nonintentional) revealed a significant main effect
reciprocate the first movers’ trust or to defect. In terms for social behavioral status [F(2,40)  48.68; p 0.001].
No significant main effect of task condition was evident,of monetary payoffs, mutual cooperation is better than
but there was a significant interaction between socialmutual defection. However, after a cooperative first
behavioral status and task condition [F(2,40)  7.46;mover’s choice, the best payoff for the second mover
p  0.002]. Post hoc contrasts confirmed that faces ofis given through defection, so that the second mover
cooperators were rated as more likeable than neutralhas a strong incentive to betray the trust of the first
faces [F(1,20)  18.18; p  0.001], and that faces ofmover. The social learning phase consisted of repeated
defectors were rated as less likeable than neutral facesinteractions with people who either reciprocated the
[F(1,20)  36.97; p  0.001]. As illustrated in Figure 1B,subject’s trust (cooperator faces), never reciprocated
the significant interaction was based on a significanttrust (defector faces), or participated in Null Games (neu-
difference between defectors and neutral faces in inten-tral faces). To disentangle the effects due to the moral
tional compared to the nonintentional task conditionstatus of a person from effects of monetary reward, half
[F(1,20)  15.48; p  0.001].of the players were introduced as intentional agents
Memory Performance
(intentional task condition), whereas the other half were
As illustrated in Figure 1C, memory for cooperator and
said to follow a given response sequence (noninten- defector faces was better than for neutral faces. A re-
tional task condition). On theoretical and empirical peated measures analysis of variance with the two within
grounds, we predicted that the face of a cooperative subject factors “social behavioral status” (cooperators,
or defecting person would elicit “automatic” emotional neutral, defectors) and task condition (intentional, non-
responses that reflect evaluative processes. Further- intentional) revealed a main effect for social behavioral
more, we predicted that discrete brain circuitry related status [F(2,20) 14.06; p 0.001], no main effect of task
to social cognition including the amygdala, orbitofrontal condition [F(1,10)  3.747; p  0.08], and a significant
cortex, striatum, insula, fusiform gyrus, and superior interaction between social behavioral status and task
temporal sulcus would be implicated in the perception condition [F(2,20)  3.87; p  0.03]. Post hoc contrasts
of defectors (cheaters) as well as cooperators (friends), revealed that the significant main effect of social behav-
and especially in the perception of faces introduced ioral status was based on better memory for cooperator
as agents with moral choice (intentional condition) as compared to neutral faces [F(1,10) 33.557; p 0.001].
Collapsed over both task conditions, there were no sig-compared to nonintentional agents.
Learned Moral Judgments and Brain Responses
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Table 1. Debriefing Questionnaire
Following rating scale was given for questions 1, 2, 3, and 5.
2 1 0 1 2
not at all very much
1. How interesting did you find the whole study?
2. How much have you been emotionally involved during the run in which
(a) persons were free to decide?
(b) persons were forced to decide?
3. How angry have you been about noncooperating players in the run in which
(a) persons were free to decide?
(b) persons were forced to decide?
4. In which aspects did both runs differ for you (e.g., application of different playing strategies, different attentional focus,
different emotional involvement, different feelings, different thoughts)?
5. How real (animated) were the persons you were playing within the run in which
(a) persons were free to decide?
(b) persons were forced to decide?
6. Did you believe that your playing partners were real living persons?
Yes No
nificant differences of memory performance for defec- left amygdala, and left fusiform/lateral inferior temporal
gyrus (for details, see Table 2).tors and neutral faces [F(1,10)  2.22; p  .167]. This
lack of difference is explained by a significant interaction To identify areas with greater responses to cooperator
relative to neutral faces, we compared cooperator andreflecting differences for defectors and neutral faces in
intentional compared to the nonintentional task condi- neutral faces, collapsed over task conditions. As shown
in Figure 2, significant predicted effects were evident intion [F(1,10)  5.21; p  0.04]. Although memory for
cooperator faces was better in the intentional compared left insula extending to OFC, left amygdala, and left
putamen (for details, see Table 2).to nonintentional task condition [t(10)  2.63, p  .02],
the interaction for cooperator compared to neutral faces The comparison between defector and neutral faces
collapsed over task conditions revealed significant ef-did not attain significance.
fects in ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (for details, see
Table 2).Neuroimaging Results
Effects of Social Behavioral Status Social Effects: Intentional Compared
to Nonintentional Task ConditionThe comparison between affective (cooperators and de-
fectors) and neutral (null games) faces revealed signifi- To determine effects specific to the intentional com-
pared to nonintentional task condition (e.g., due to com-cant effects in ventromedial prefrontal cortex, left insula,
Figure 1. Postscan Behavioral Assessment
of Emotional Involvement as well as Likeabil-
ity Ratings and Memory Performance for Co-
operators, Defectors, and Neutral Faces in
Intentional and Nonintentional Task Con-
dition
(A) The subjective responses provided by the
subjects when asked (a) how much they felt
emotionally involved; (b) how angry they were
about noncooperating players; and (c) how
real and animated the players appeared in
the intentional and nonintentional task condi-
tion. Subjects used a rating scale ranging
from 2  very much, 0  neutral, through
to 2  not at all.
(B) The subjective likeability ratings for faces
of cooperators, defectors, and neutral in in-
tentional and nonintentional task condition,
using a scale ranging from2 very likeable,
0neutral, through to2not likeable at all.
(C) Percentage of cooperator, defector, and
neutral faces correctly recalled in the inten-
tional and nonintentional task condition. Sub-
jects were asked whether the presented per-
son had “mostly cooperated” and could
respond with “yes” (in case of cooperators),
“no” (in case of defectors), “null” (in case of




activations in posterior STS, bilateral fusiform gyrus,Table 2. Cerebral Foci of Activation for Contrasts of Interest
bilateral insula cortex, right and left lateral OFC, and
Coordinates of Peak
ventral striatum including right and left nucleus accum-Activation (mm)
bens (see Figure 3; for details see Table 3). Differential
Brain Regions x y z Z Scores activity in left amygdala was observed above threshold
Affective-Neutral Faces only in two voxels (21, 9, 33; z  3.40; p  0.001,
uncorrected) and below threshold for coordinates iden-Ventro-medial OFC 0 51 21 4.84
tified in previous comparisons (21, 0, 18; z  2.71;Left anterior insula/OFC 42 18 12 4.36
p  0.003, uncorrected).Left amygdala 21 0 21 3.34*
Left fusiform gyrus/lateral To further determine whether responses were modu-
inferior temporal gyrus 45 66 21 3.83 lated by social context, we examined the interaction
Inferior frontal sulcus 36 3 39 4.02 between social behavioral status (affective faces-neu-
Inferior frontal gyrus 45 36 6 3.37
tral faces) and task condition (intentional versus nonin-
Cooperator-Neutral Faces tentional). No significant activations were evident in re-
gions of interest for the interaction involving affectiveLeft insula 39 18 15 4.38
Amygdala/ventral putamen 18 3 15 3.92 compared to neutral faces as well as for the interaction
Left amygdala 21 0 18 3.89* involving defector or cooperator compared to neutral
Left putamen 24 6 9 3.81 faces alone. At a threshold of p  0.05 (uncorrected),
Left inferior PFC 45 39 6 3.59 however, significant effects in amygdala, putamen, and
Defector-Neutral Faces insula—brain regions all identified in the main effect of
cooperator-neutral faces—reflected greater activity forVentro-medial PFC 0 54 21 3.85
faces of cooperators versus neutral faces in intentionalInferior frontal sulcus 33 6 39 4.20
compared to nonintentional task condition.
All values, p  0.001 uncorrected. *p  0.05 corrected for multiple
comparisons across a small volume of interest.
Discussion
We investigated whether brain circuitry identified as rel-pliance or violation of social rules), we examined effects
as a function of task condition (intentional versus nonin- evant for social judgments of facial expression, attrac-
tiveness, trustworthiness, or racial identity (Aharon ettentional task condition). No significant differences be-
tween intentional and nonintentional task condition were al., 2001; Hart et al., 2000; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Morris
et al., 1996; Phillips et al., 1997; Winston et al., 2002,evident when comparing the combined affective faces
or when comparing defector faces alone. For cooperator 2003) also provide a basis for a moral judgments ac-
quired through social learning in an interactive context.faces alone, the same comparison revealed significant
Figure 2. Brain Responses to Faces of Coop-
erators Compared to Faces of People In-
volved in Neutral Null Games
The figure illustrates (A) activation in left
amygdala extending anteriorly into ventral
striatum with (B) a separate peak in this region
showing significantly greater responses to
faces of cooperators compared to neutral
faces of people involved in null games. Also
shown in (C) is activity in left insula. The
threshold is set at p  0.001 uncorrected.
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Figure 3. Brain Responses to Faces of Cooperators Who Were Introduced as Intentional Agents Compared to Cooperators Who Were Said
to Follow a Prescribed Response Sequence
Highlighted regions reflect brain areas that show significantly greater effects when subjects made gender judgments about faces of cooperators
that have been endowed with intentionality. Specific social effects were present on a p  0.001 level in right fusiform gyrus (see A and C)
and right posterior STS (see A). Panel (B) illustrates BOLD signal change in posterior STS (see also A) for cooperator, defector, and neutral
faces as a function of intentional and nonintentional task condition. Significant activity was also shown in bilateral insula (see C and D), ventral
striatum with distinct peaks in right putamen, as well as in left and right nucleus accumbens (see D) and left and right lateral OFC (see E).
STS, superior temporal sulcus; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex.
We chose mutual cooperation and defection (cheating) was better than for neutral faces. This finding is consis-
tent with previous findings showing better memory forduring interactive game play because analytical models,
computer simulations, as well as empirical data from people introduced as cheaters with the help of short
vignettes (Mealey et al., 1996). Interestingly, in the pres-game theory, economics, and evolutionary biology (Ax-
elrod and Hamilton, 1981; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000, 2002; ent study, memory for cooperators exceeded that for
defectors, pointing perhaps to an enhanced saliency ofNowak et al., 2000; Trivers, 1971; Wedekind and Milinski,
2000) point to the evolutionary importance of mutual mutual cooperation in human interaction.
The most robust neural responses were evident tocooperation and fairness in human societies coupled
with an ability to readily distinguish between friend and presentation of cooperator rather than defector faces,
and particularly to cooperator faces introduced as inten-foe among conspecifics (Cosmides and Tooby, 2000).
Behavioral assessments after scanning confirmed the tional agents. Our findings of activation in amygdala,
striatum including putamen and nucleus accumbens,saliency of perceived fairness of conspecifics as indi-
cated by cooperative or defective behavior during social lateral orbitofrontal cortex, insula, fusiform gyrus, and
STS in response to cooperator faces are highly consis-interactions. Compared to faces involved in null games
(neutral behavioral status), faces of cooperators and tent with general models of social cognition (e.g., Adolphs
2003; Brothers, 1990). The findings extend these modelsdefectors were rated as much more and much less like-
able, respectively. Note that differential affective judg- to processing of stimuli that acquire their social rele-
vance through meaningful interactive social contexts.ments cannot be attributed to differences in facial fea-
tures of the pictures given that all faces had neutral The identified regions were engaged automatically by
the mere presence of socially salient faces since sub-facial expressions and were randomly distributed over
subjects. Acquired saliency of cooperators and defec- jects were not explicitly asked to make social judgments
about the fairness of the persons depicted. These find-tors was further corroborated in free recall performances
showing that memory for cooperators and defectors ings are in agreement with previous fMRI studies dem-
Neuron
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as bilateral OFC based on the perception of intentionalTable 3. Cerebral Foci of Activation for Intentional versus
Nonintentional Cooperator Faces players is in accordance with findings from extensive
animal literature on reward processing (for a review, seeCoordinates of
Schultz, 2000) and several fMRI studies in humans usingPeak Activation
different kinds of rewarding stimuli such as abstract(mm)
monetary rewards (Delgaldo et al., 2000; Elliott et al.,Brain Regions x y z Z Scores
2000, 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2001), attractive faces
Predicted Brain Regions (Aharon et al., 2001; O’Doherty et al., 2003), or pleasant
sensory stimuli (Rolls et al., 1997; O’Doherty et al., 2002).Right fusiform gyrus 42 48 33 3.70
Left middle temporal gyrus 51 66 0 4.11 In conjunction with results of a previous fMRI study in
Left lateral fusiform gyrus 51 63 21 4.13 which striatal activation was observed during mutual
Right posterior STS 54 48 18 3.96 cooperation in an iterated version of a simultaneous
Left anterior STS 51 9 15 3.47
Prisoner’s Dilemma game when playing against a humanLeft anterior insula 45 6 6 4.08
partner but not against a computer partner (Rilling et al.,Left posterior insula 39 24 3 3.96
2002), the observation of task-specific reward-relatedRight anterior insula/OFC 42 21 15 3.97
Right putamen/ 15 9 9 3.92 activation suggests that social fairness is experienced
Right nucleus accumbens 6 9 3 3.24 as rewarding per se. Thus, neural responses in these
Left nucleus accumbens 12 9 6 3.33 regions extend beyond players’ processing of out-
Left lateral OFC 33 30 21 3.73
comes, such as monetary gain, usually associated withRight lateral OFC 36 33 15 3.43
mutual cooperation in human societies, and reflect emo-
Other Brain Regions tional responses based on social and moral judgments.
Parieto-occipital fissure 21 51 12 4.05 Another region commonly associated with reward
Parieto-occipital fissure 9 78 42 3.47 processing as well as processing of emotionally and
Left lingual gyrus 33 45 9 3.93 socially salient stimuli (Adolphs et al., 1998; Bachevalier,
Left retrosplenial cortex 9 54 6 3.78 2000; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Hart et al., 2000; Phelps
Right retrosplenial cortex 21 45 3 3.49
et al., 2000; Winston et al., 2002) is the amygdala. In theInferior temporal gyrus 39 6 39 3.79
present study, we observed left amygdala activation inAnterior middle temporal gyrus 63 9 27 3.55
Precentral sulcus 30 3 54 3.58 response to cooperator compared to neutral faces. Only
Left cuneus 6 75 12 3.44 weak evidence (below our 6 voxel extent threshold at
p  0.001) for an interaction between social behavioralAll values, p  0.001 uncorrected.
status and task condition in amygdala was found. Fur-
ther replication will be necessary before strong conclu-
sions about specific involvement of amygdala in socialonstrating automatic, task-independent affective re-
judgment can be drawn. Nevertheless, amygdala activa-sponses during perception of socially salient features
tion in response to positive stimuli, as represented bysuch as facial expressions of emotions, trustworthiness,
faces of fair conspecifics, is of considerable importanceattractiveness, or racial identity (O’Doherty et al., 2003;
because it contrasts with a predominant involvementPhelps et al., 2000; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Whalen et
in processing threat-related and emotionally negativeal., 1998; Winston et al., 2002, 2003).
stimuli (e.g., Adolphs, 1999; LeDoux, 1998, 2000; MorrisIt should be noted that the enhanced activity we ob-
et al., 1996; Phan et al., 2002). For example, Winstonserved was not only based on reward-related activation
et al. (2002) observed greater amygdala activation indue to a learned association between the presented
response to untrustworthy compared to trustworthyfaces and losing or winning money. Activation in reward-
faces. Rilling et al. (2002) did not find amygdala activa-related areas such as ventral striatum (including nucleus
tion during mutual cooperation in the repeated Prison-accumbens and putamen) and bilateral orbitofrontal
er’s Dilemma game. Our finding points to social saliencycortex was also observed when testing for the effect of
of fair behavior in social judgment as a potent activatormoral status in comparing cooperator faces of players
of the amygdala and suggests that a negative bias ob-in the intentional with those in the nonintentional task
served in emotion studies may reflect on the difficultycondition. Both task conditions were identical during
in equating the salience of positive and negative stimuli.learning and by consequence involved the same amount
One suggested role for the amygdala is feedbackof monetary losses and gains. The difference depended
modulation of sensory cortices during processing ofon an attribution regarding the intentionality of the play-
salient stimuli (e.g., Adolphs, 2003; Anderson and Phelps,ers. In contrast to the intentional task condition, subjects
2001; Dolan, 2002; Morris et al., 1998). The observationwere not able to morally assess the actions of the players
of bilateral activation in face-responsive regions of thein the nonintentional task condition. Our behavioral anal-
fusiform gyrus to socially relevant faces (intentional ver-yses revealed that these tasks were perceived as differ-
sus nonintentional cooperators) is in line with such anent by our subjects. They reported that they were more
interpretation. Note that bilateral fusiform gyrus activa-emotionally involved and more angry about defectors
tion was also observable at a p 0.05 uncorrected levelin the intentional compared to the nonintentional task
when testing specific social effects by computing thecondition (see Figure 1A). These findings are in line with
interaction between social status and task condition.assumptions of inequity aversions in humans (Fehr and
Similarly, other fMRI studies report enhanced fusiformSchmidt, 1999).
activation at similar coordinates in response to trustwor-The finding of enhanced reward-related activity in stri-
atum including putamen and nucleus accumbens as well thiness (Winston et al., 2002) or emotional expression
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in face stimuli (e.g., Breiter et al., 1996; Morris et al., Surprisingly, we did not observe reliable activation in
1998; Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Winston et al., 2003). regions of interest in response to faces of defectors.
In addition to fusiform activation, we observed activa- The only exception was activation in medial OFC when
tion in the right posterior STS specific to implicit social comparing defector and neutral faces. However, we
judgments of cooperator faces introduced as free inten- cannot conclude that detecting cheaters is less salient
tional agents. It has been suggested that STS has a than recognizing friends. Theoretical accounts, and in-
role in processing dynamic aspects of faces (e.g., facial deed our behavioral findings, would contradict such a
expressions, eye gaze) and the whole body as well as conclusion. Indeed, subjects rated defectors as signifi-
in the detection of intentions (for reviews, see Allison et cantly less likeable than neutral faces. Social effects as
al., 2000; Frith and Frith, 2003; Puce and Perrett, 2003). indicated by the interaction between “social behavioral
For example, posterior STS activation close to the coor- status” and “task condition” showed stronger negative
dinates observed in the present study has been reported likeability ratings and better memory for defector com-
during so-called mentalizing or “theory of mind tasks” pared to neutral faces in the intentional compared to
requiring the understanding of intentions, feelings, and nonintentional task condition. Furthermore, subjects in
goals of others, be it persons or moving geometrical the debriefing questionnaire indicated feelings of anger
shapes engaged in complex interactions (Castelli et al., about defectors in the intentional task. These results
2000: right STS: 60,56, 12; Gallagher et al., 2000: right speak to a strong saliency for defectors and suggest a
STS: 60,48, 22; Schultz et al., 2003: right STS: 51,57, lack of statistical power for defectors given the smaller
15; for a review, see also Frith and Frith, 2003). Interest- number of defector compared to cooperator faces. To
ingly, and in contrast to the present study, all mentalizing enhance credibility and cooperation in the scanned sub-
studies required subjects to make some sort of explicit jects, each run comprised five cooperative players and
social judgments about the animacy, goals, intentions, only three defecting players. It is noteworthy that Rilling
or desires of other beings—be it a person or animated and colleagues using a simultaneous version of the Pris-
geometrical shapes. Recent evidence suggests, indeed, oner’s Dilemma game (see above) likewise reported
that activity in STS may be mediated by explicit attention more robust effects for mutual cooperation compared to
to socially salient features (see also Schultz et al., 2003) defection. It would be of interest to demonstrate similar
and that, in contrast to the amygdala, right posterior activations in response to defectors in follow-up experi-
STS activation is greater when subjects make explicit ments optimized for reliable assessment of defection in
judgments about trustworthiness compared to age judg- human interactions.
ments on facial stimuli (e.g., Winston et al., 2002). In In conclusion, behavioral and functional brain data
the present study, however, we observed greater right indicate saliency of perceived fairness for human inter-
posterior STS activity during gender judgments associ- actions and point to an inherently rewarding value for
ated with intentional compared to nonintentional agents. mutual cooperation in human societies. Furthermore,
We suggest that our subjects did indeed attribute more our functional imaging data give support for neural cir-
intentionality to the players as indicated by the results cuitry proposed in recent models of social cognition
from the debriefing questionnaire (Table 1). Subjects (Adolphs, 1999, 2003; see also Brothers, 1990). In accord
rated such persons to be more real and animated in with the three-level model of social cognition proposed
the intentional compared to players introduced in the by Adolphs (2003), we demonstrate enhanced activity
nonintentional task condition (for similar behavioral find- in higher-order visual cortices such as fusiform gyrus
ings, see Opfer, 2002). Our data support a general role and posterior STS in response to socially salient stimuli
for STS for processing socially salient signals ranging (faces of cooperators). In addition, we show activation
from simple human behavior to mental states and inten- of amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, and striatum, three
tions underlying the behavior of conspecifics. Moreover, areas postulated to link incoming sensory stimuli to the
our data extends the proposed role of STS by suggesting
motivational evaluation necessary to guide behavior. On
that it may not only be involved during explicit social
the basis of these data, we conclude that previously
inferences, but also triggered automatically by socially
identified neural systems involved in social cognitionsalient signals.
extend to stimuli that acquire their salience throughFinally, we observed activation in insula cortex: left
rapid social learning that reflects the moral evaluationanterior insula when comparing affective to neutral faces
of others in interactive contexts.and bilateral anterior insula when comparing cooperator
faces in intentional versus nonintentional task condi-
Experimental Procedurestions. Activation in anterior insula has been reported in a
wide range of imaging studies using social or emotional
Subjects
stimuli (Bu¨chel et al., 1999; Critchley et al., 2001; Hart A total of 18 healthy subjects were scanned. The reported analyses
et al., 2000; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Phelps et al., 2000; were based on 11 healthy right-handed normal subjects (6 male, 5
Phillips et al., 1997; Sanfey et al., 2003). Models of social female). The mean age of subjects was 25.6 (SD 4.81; age range
cognition and emotion (e.g., Adolphs, 1999; Critchley et 21–36). All subjects gave informed consent and the study was ap-
proved by the local research ethics committee. Given that the socialal., 2004; Churchland, 2002; Damasio, 1994; Dolan, 2002)
cognition paradigm used required that the subjects believed thathave proposed that insular cortex provides a matrix
they were interacting with real people, a debriefing questionnairefor the conscious representation of “feeling states.” In
was developed to assess the success of this critical manipulation.
accordance with such a proposal, our debriefing ques- Three subjects had to be excluded on the basis of their answers in
tionnaire shows that subjects reported feelings of emo- the debriefing questionnaire. Two subjects indicated that they did
tional involvement during interaction with the inten- not believe that they were actually playing with real people during
the game (see question six of the debriefing questionnaire outlinedtional players.
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in detail in the next section), and one indicated that he had doubts. were free to decide after they have seen the face and the investment
decision of the scanned subjects (intentional task condition). In theA further three subjects were excluded because they showed more
than 12 no-trust decisions in either or both task conditions and other they would be connected to a platform where players were
forced to follow a given response sequence determined by a com-had by consequence fewer opportunities to learn the emotional
properties of the relevant faces during the social learning phase puter based on observed population distributions (nonintentional
task condition). The order of task condition was counterbalanced(see below). Finally, one subject was excluded because of technical
problems during data acquisition. between subjects and faces were distributed randomly over sub-
jects. The latter controlled for possible differences in facial featuresIn a behavioral pilot study, an additional 10 subjects (2 men, 8
women, mean age  26.8 years; SD  9.37; age range  20–52 of the face images such as attractiveness, facial expression, or trust-
worthiness.years) were tested on the behavioral tasks only. From the 15 original
participants, two subjects had to be excluded because of more than The retrieval phase involved subjects being scanned while pre-
senting seven repetitions of each of the 22 faces (5 cooperators, 312 nontrusting decisions, one subject due to technical problems,
and two subjects because of a lack of belief in the experimental defectors, 3 neutral in intentional and nonintentional task condition)
introduced during the social learning phase. The faces were ran-manipulation. If not otherwise stated, the behavioral analyses are
based on the pooled sample of 21 subjects, and the imaging results domly presented and interspersed with 39 null event trials (25%) in
which a fixation cross was presented for 3000 ms (total number ofon the scanned cohort of 11 subjects.
trials was 193 events). Faces were presented for 500 ms followed
by a fixation cross for another 2500 ms. Subjects were asked toStimulus Set
judge as quickly as possible by pressing one of two buttons withSixty-seven face stimuli were selected from a larger pool of Cauca-
their right hand whether the perceived face was a female or malesian faces (the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces). Equal num-
gender.bers of female and male faces were selected, all of them depicting
After scanning, subjects were asked to take part in a computerizedgreyscale frontal images of their faces with frontal gaze direction
behavioral assessment involving two separate tasks and to fill out aand neutral facial expression. All stimuli had equal size and were
questionnaire at the end. The first task was self-paced and subjectsequated for luminance and centered on a black background.
rated likeability of all 22 faces (not likeable at all, not likeable, neutral,
likeable, very likeable). The second task was a forced choice mem-
Experimental Paradigm ory task in which subjects were asked to remember what the players
The experiment was divided into four parts: an instruction phase, have actually done during playing. The question was “Did this person
a social learning phase, a retrieval phase, and a behavioral assess- mostly cooperate?” and subjects had to choose between “yes,”
ment phase. “no,” “don’t know” or “null” when they remembered the face being
In the instruction phase, subjects were told that they would play involved in a null game. The debriefing questionnaire included six
interactive computer games via the internet with different people questions and is displayed in Table 1. The results of questions 2, 3,
from different research institutions around Europe. Subjects were and 5 are displayed in Figure 1. Questions 1 and 4 served exploratory
instructed that they would be randomly paired with one of the play- purposes and question 6 was an exclusion criterium of people not
ers in the pool for one game and they would be unable to predict with believing in the manipulation.
whom they would play before each game. To increase credibility,
subjects were then photographed and told that their pictures would
be edited to be adapted to the frame of the game and subsequently Image Acquisition and Analysis
Images were acquired using a 1.5 Tesla Siemens Sonata MRI scan-fed into the computer to allow the other player to see them as
well. The rules of the game were then explained in detail, and a ner to acquire gradient-echo, echoplanar T2*-weighted echo-planar
images (EPI) with blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) con-questionnaire indicated that subjects understood the rules and prin-
ciples of the game. trast. Each volume comprised 35 axial slices of 2 mm thickness with
1 mm slice gap and 3  3 mm in-plane resolution. Volumes wereThe social learning phase included two runs (intentional and non-
intentional task condition) consisting of 56 games each, resulting in acquired continuously every 3.15 s. Each run began with 6 “dummy”
volumes discarded for analyses. At the end of each scanning ses-a total of 112 games. The game was a sequential iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, in which a first player can trust a second player by sion, a T1-weighted structural image was acquired.
The images were analyzed using SPM2 (Wellcome Departmentsending his/her starting points (transferred to money at the end of
the game) to the other player, knowing that each point sent will be of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) using an event-related model
(Josephs et al., 1997). To correct for motion, functional volumestripled. The second player then has the opportunity to reciprocate
by sending money back, which is also tripled, resulting in equal were realigned to the first volume (Friston et al., 1995a), spatially
normalized to a standard template with a resampled voxel size ofpayoffs for both players. The second player, however, can decide
to keep the money and maximize his own earnings at the expense 3  3  3 mm, and smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full
width at half maximum (FWHM) of 10 mm. In addition, high passof the first player. Subjects in the scanner were always the first
player and made their investment decision before they knew with temporal filtering with a cut-off of 128 s was applied. After prepro-
cessing, statistical analysis was carried out using the general linearwhom they would be paired. During a run, subjects were repeatedly
connected with five cooperator faces (players who always recipro- model (Friston et al., 1995b). The presentation of each face was
modeled by convolving a delta function at each event onset with acated trust), three defector faces (players who always kept their
money), and three neutral faces involved in null games. Null games canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) and its temporal
and dispersion derivatives to create regressors of interest. Residualwere introduced to allow for a neutral baseline condition controlling
for contextual factors associated with the game. Subjects were told effects of head motion were corrected for by including the six esti-
mated motion parameters for each subject as regressors of no inter-that due to technical reasons in some games they would take an
investment decision, see their game partner as always, but would est. Contrast images were then calculated by applying appropriate
linear contrasts to the parameter estimates for the parametric re-not receive any response from their partner and in consequence
would neither lose nor win any money. Throughout a run, each of gressor of each event. These contrast images were then entered into
a one-sample t test across the 11 subjects (random effects analysis).the 11 relevant faces was repeated four times in pseudo-random
order. Twelve additional games were added to the sequence to The experiment constituted a 3  2 factorial design with the first
factor representing social behavioral status (cooperator, defector,compensate for possible noninvestment decisions by the scanned
subject. Points were converted into real money at the end of the and neutral faces) and the second factor being task condition (inten-
tional and nonintentional task condition). Statistical parametricexperiment. Each point corresponded to one pence and each sub-
ject received 20 pounds in total. To ensure equal payments for every maps of the main effects of social behavioral status and task condi-
tion as well as the interactions between both factors were inspected.subject, we rounded up payment for the subjects who opted for
conservative strategies (i.e., defected frequently). In addition, linear contrasts between cooperator and defector faces
in the intentional versus nonintentional task condition were com-Subjects were instructed that they would play two runs of games.
In one they would be connected to a platform where all players puted.
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We report results in a priori regions of interest (amygdala, OFC, dala-hippocampal involvement in human aversive trace conditioning
revealed through event-related functional magnetic resonance im-fusiform, STS, striatum, and insula) at p  0.001 uncorrected for
multiple comparisons with an extent threshold of more than 6 contig- aging. J. Neurosci. 19, 10869–10876.
uous voxels. In the case of the amygdala, we also indicate if this Castelli, F., Happe, F., Frith, U., and Frith, C. (2000). Movement and
region survives correction for multiple comparisons within a small mind: a functional imaging study of perception and interpretation of
volume defined around the region of interest using the theory of complex intentional movement patterns. Neuroimage 12, 314–325.
Gaussian random fields (Worseley et al., 1996). The volume of inter-
Churchland, P.S. (2002). Self-representation in nervous systems.est for amygdala was defined by drawing a mask around the region
Science 296, 308–310.bilaterally of approximately 10 cm3. For descriptive purposes, we
Cosmides, L., and Tooby, J. (2000). The cognitive neuroscience ofreport activations outside regions of interest at p  0.001 with an
social reasoning. In The New Cognitive Neuroscience, M.S. Gazzan-extent threshold of more than 6 contiguous voxels.
iga, ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press), pp. 1259–1276.
Acknowledgments Critchley, H.D., Corfield, D.R., Chandler, M.P., Mathias, C.J., and
Dolan, R.J. (2000). Cerebral correlates of autonomic cardiovascular
This work was supported by the German Academy of Natural Sci- arousal: a functional neuroimaging investigation in humans. J. Phys-
ences Leopoldina, Halle, with the grant BMBF-LPD 9901/8-73 from iol. 523, 259–270.
the Ministry of Education and Science, and by the Wellcome Depart- Critchley, H.D., Mathias, C.J., and Dolan, R.J. (2001). Neuroanatomi-
ment of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK. We thank P. Rothstein cal basis for first- and second-order representations of bodily states.
and J. O’Doherty for useful comments. We thank J.E. Litton for Nat. Neurosci. 4, 207–212.
providing us with the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces, pro-
Critchley, H.D., Wiens, S., Rotshtein, P., Ohman, A., and Dolan, R.J.duced originally by Lundqvist and Litton at the Department of Neuro-
(2004). Neural systems supporting interoceptive awareness. Nat.science, Karolinska Hospital, Stockholm, Sweden, in 1998.
Neurosci., in press Published online January 18, 2004. 10.1038/
nn1176.Received: September 22, 2003
Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes’ Error. (New York: Putman).Revised: December 23, 2003
Accepted: December 30, 2003 Delgado, M.R., Nystrom, L.E., Fissell, C., Noll, D.C., and Fiez, J.A.
Published: February 18, 2004 (2000). Tracking the haemodynamic response to reward and punish-
ment in the striatum. J. Neurophysiol. 84, 3072–3077.
References Dolan, R.J. (2002). Emotion, cognition, and behavior. Science 298,
1191–1194.
Adolphs, R. (1999). Social cognition and the human brain. Trends
Elliott, R., Friston, K.J., and Dolan, R.J. (2000). Dissociable neuralCogn. Sci. 3, 469–479.
responses in human reward systems. J. Neurosci. 20, 6159–6165.
Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience of human social behav-
Elliott, R., Newman, J.L., Longe, O.A., and Deakin, J.F.W. (2003).iour. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 4, 165–178.
Differential response patterns in the striatum and orbitofrontal cor-
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., and Damasio, A.R. (1998). The human amyg- tex to financial reward in humans: a parametric functional magnetic
dala in social judgment. Nature 393, 470–474. resonance imaging study. J. Neurosci. 23, 303–307.
Aharon, I., Etcoff, N., Ariely, D., Chabris, C.F., O’Connor, E., and
Fehr, E., and Ga¨chter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in
Breiter, H.C. (2001). Beautiful faces have variable reward value: fMRI
public goods experiments. Am. Econ. Rev. 90, 980–994.
and behavioral evidence 1. Neuron 32, 537–551.
Fehr, E., and Ga¨chter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans 2.
Alexander, R.D. (1987). The biology of moral systems (New York:
Nature 415, 137–140.
de Gruyter).
Fehr, E., and Schmidt, K.M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition,Allison, T., Puce, A., and McCarthy, G. (2000). Social perception from
and cooperation. Quar. J. Econ. 114, 817–868.visual cues: role of the STS region. Trends Cogn. Sci. 4, 267–278.
Friston, K.J., Ashburner, J., Poline, J.B., Frith, C.D., Heather, J.D.,Anderson, A.K., and Phelps, E.A. (2001). Lesions of the human amyg-
and Frackowiak, R.S. (1995a). Spatial registration and normalizationdala impair enhanced perception of emotionally salient events. Na-
of images. Hum. Brain Mapp. 2, 165–189.ture 411, 305–309.
Friston, K.J., Holmes, A.P., Worsley, K.J., Poline, J.P., Frith, C.D., andAxelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation (New York: Basic
Frackowiak, R.S. (1995b). Statistical parametric maps in functionalBooks).
imaging: a general linear approach. Hum. Brain Mapp. 2, 189–210.
Axelrod, R., and Hamilton, W.D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation.
Frith, U., and Frith, C.D. (2003). Development and neurophysiologyScience 211, 1390–1396.
of mentalizing. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 358, 459–473.
Bachevalier, J. (2000). The amygdala, social behavior, and autism.
Gallagher, H.L., Happe, F., Brunswick, N., Fletcher, P.C., Frith, U.,In The Amygdala: A Functional Analysis, J. Aggleton, ed. (New York:
and Frith, C.D. (2000). Reading the mind in cartoons and stories:Guilford Press), pp. 509–544.
an fMRI study of ‘theory of mind’ in verbal and nonverbal tasks.
Baron-Cohen, S., Ring, H.A., Wheelwright, S., Bullmore, E.T., Bram-
Neuropsychologia 38, 11–21.
mer, M.J., Simmons, A., and Williams, S.C. (1999). Social intelligence
Hart, A.J., Whalen, P.J., Shin, L.M., McInerney, S.C., Fischer, H.,in the normal and autistic brain: an fMRI study. Eur. J. Neurosci.
and Rauch, S.L. (2000). Differential response in the human amygdala11, 1891–1898.
to racial outgroup vs ingroup face stimuli. Neuroreport 11, 2351–Breiter, H.C., Etcoff, N.L., Whalen, P.J., Kennedy, W.A., Rauch, S.L.,
2355.Buckner, R.L., Strauss, M.M., Hymen, S.E., and Rosen, B.R. (1996).
Josephs, O., Turner, R., and Friston, K. (1997). Event-related fMRI.Response and habituation of the human amygdala during visual
Hum. Brain Mapp. 5, 243–248.processing of facial expression. Neuron 17, 875–887.
Knutson, B., Westdorp, A., Kaiser, E., and Hommer, D. (2000). fMRIBreiter, H.C., Aharon, I., Kahneman, D., Dale, A., and Shizgal, P.
visualization of brain activity during a monetary incentive delay task.(2001). Functional imaging of neural responses to expectancy and
Neuroimage 12, 20–27.experience of monetary gains and losses. Neuron 30, 619–639.
LeDoux, J.E. (1998). The Emotional Brain (London: Weidenfeld &Brosnan, S.F., and De Waal, F.B. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal
Nicholson).pay. Nature 425, 297–299.
LeDoux, J.E. (2000). Emotion circuits in the brain. Annu. Rev. Neu-Brothers, L. (1990). The social brain: a project for integrating primate
rosci. 23, 155–184.behavior and neurophysiology in a new domain. Concepts Neurosci.
1, 27–51. Mealey, L., Daood, C., and Krage, M. (1996). Enhanced memory for
faces of cheaters. Ethol. Sociobiol. 17, 119–128.Bu¨chel, C., Dolan, R.J., Armony, J.L., and Friston, K.J. (1999). Amyg-
Neuron
662
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., and Krambeck, H.J. (2002). Reputation Winston, J.S., Strange, B.A., O’Doherty, J., and Dolan, R.J. (2002).
Automatic and intentional brain responses during evaluation of trust-helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Nature 415, 424–426.
worthiness of faces. Nat. Neurosci. 5, 277–283.Morris, J.S., Frith, C.D., Perrett, D.I., Rowland, D., Young, A.W.,
Winston, J.S., O’Doherty, J.P., and Dolan, R.J. (2003). Common andCalder, A.J., and Dolan, R.J. (1996). A differential neural response
sitinct neural responses during direct and incidental processing ofin the human amygdala to fearful and happy facial expressions.
multiple facial emotions. Neuroimage 20, 84–97.Nature 383, 812–815.
Worsley, K.J., Marrett, S., Neelin, P., Vandal, A.C., Friston, K.J., andMorris, J.S., Ohman, A., and Dolan, R.J. (1998). Conscious and un-
Evans, A.C. (1996). A unified statistical approach for determiningconscious emotional learning in the human amygdala. Nature 393,
significant signals in images of cerebral activation. Hum. Brain467–470.
Mapp. 4, 58–73.Nowak, M.A., and Sigmund, K. (1998a). The dynamics of indirect
reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 194, 561–574.
Nowak, M.A., and Sigmund, K. (1998b). Evolution of indirect reci-
procity by image scoring. Nature 393, 573–577.
Nowak, M.A., Page, K.M., and Sigmund, K. (2000). Fairness versus
reason in the ultimatum game. Science 289, 1773–1775.
O’Doherty, J., Kringelbach, M.L., Rolls, E.T., Hornak, J., and An-
drews, C. (2001). Abstract reward and punishment representations
in the human orbitofrontal cortex. Nat. Neurosci. 4, 95–102.
O’Doherty, J., Deichmann, R., Critchley, H.D., and Dolan, R.J. (2002).
Neural responses during anticipation of a primary taste reward.
Neuron 33, 815–826.
O’Doherty, J., Winston, J., Critchley, H., Perrett, D., Burt, D.M., and
Dolan, R.J. (2003). Beauty in a smile: the role of medial orbitofrontal
cortex in facial attractiveness. Neuropsychologia 41, 147–155.
Opfer, J.E. (2002). Identifying living and sentient kinds from dynamic
information: the case of goal-directed versus aimless autonomous
movement in conceptual change. Cognition 86, 97–122.
Phan, K.L., Wager, T., Taylor, S.F., and Liberzon, I. (2002). Functional
neuroanatomy of emotion: a meta-analysis of emotion activation
studies in PET and fMRI. Neuroimage 16, 331–348.
Phelps, E.A. (2001). Faces and races in the brain. Nat. Neurosci.
4, 775–776.
Phelps, E.A., O’Connor, K.J., Cunningham, W.A., Funayama, E.S.,
Gatenby, J.C., Gore, J.C., and Banaji, M.R. (2000). Performance on
indirect measures of race evaluation predicts amygdala activation.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 12, 729–738.
Phillips, M.L., Young, A.W., Senior, C., Brammer, M., Andrew, C.,
Calder, A.J., Bullmore, E.T., Perrett, D.I., Rowland, D., Williams, S.C.,
et al. (1997). A specific neural substrate for perceiving facial expres-
sions of disgust. Nature 389, 495–498.
Puce, A., and Perrett, D. (2003). Electrophysiology and brain imaging
of biological motion. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 358,
435–445.
Rilling, J., Gutman, D., Zeh, T., Pagnoni, G., Berns, G., and Kilts, C.
(2002). A neural basis for social cooperation. Neuron 35, 395–405.
Rolls, E.T., Francis, S., Bowtell, R., Browning, D., Clare, S., Smith,
T., and McGlone, F. (1997). Taste and olfactory activation of the
orbitofrontal cortex. Neuroimage 5, 199.
Sanfey, A.G., Rilling, J.K., Aronson, J.A., Nystrom, L.E., and Cohen,
J.D. (2003). The neural basis of economic decision-making in the
Ultimatum Game. Science 300, 1755–1758.
Schultz, W. (2000). Multiple reward signals in the brain. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 1, 199–207.
Schultz, R.T., Grelotti, D.J., Klin, A., Kleinman, J., Van der Gaag, C.,
Marois, R., and Skudlarski, P. (2003). The role of the fusiform face
area in social cognition: implications for the pathobiology of autism.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 358, 415–427.
Trivers, R. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q. Rev. Biol.
46, 39–57.
Vuilleumier, P., Armony, J.L., Driver, J., and Dolan, R.J. (2001). Ef-
fects of attention and emotion on face processing in the human
brain: an event-related fMRI study. Neuron 30, 829–841.
Wedekind, C., and Milinski, M. (2000). Cooperation through image
scoring in humans. Science 288, 850–852.
Whalen, P.J., Rauch, S.L., Etcoff, N.L., McInerney, S.C., Lee, M.B.,
and Jenike, M.A. (1998). Masked presentations of emotional facial
expressions modulate amygdala activity without explicit knowledge.
J. Neurosci. 18, 411–418.
